The Blood Telegram

1. Nixon's Personal Biases Shaped US Policy

Nixon enjoyed his friendship with Pakistan’s military dictator, General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan, known as Yahya, who was helping to set up the top secret opening to China.

Personal animosity. Nixon harbored a deep-seated dislike for India and its leaders, stemming from his early encounters with Jawaharlal Nehru and his perceived pro-Soviet leanings. This personal bias influenced his administration's approach to the 1971 crisis.

• Nixon found Nehru "arrogant, abrasive, and suffocatingly self-righteous."
• He viewed India's non-alignment policy as siding with the Soviet Union.

Favoritism towards Pakistan. In contrast, Nixon admired Pakistan's military dictator, Yahya Khan, and valued Pakistan's role as a Cold War ally and a secret channel to China. This friendship led him to overlook Yahya's brutal actions in East Pakistan.

• Nixon found the Pakistanis to be "completely frank" and staunchly anti-communist.
• He was haunted by Ayub Khan's lament about the dangers of being a friend of the United States.

Consequences of bias. Nixon's personal biases led to a foreign policy that prioritized personal relationships and Cold War calculations over humanitarian concerns, resulting in a moral failure in the face of genocide.

2. The Cyclone and Botched Relief Efforts Fueled Bengali Nationalism

The cyclone was the real reason for the final break.

Natural disaster. A devastating cyclone in November 1970 killed hundreds of thousands in East Pakistan, exacerbating existing tensions between the Bengali population and the West Pakistani government.

• The cyclone caused gales shrieking to 150 miles an hour, followed by a monstrous tidal wave over twenty feet high.
• The State Department put the death toll even higher, at half a million, many of them drowned.

Government negligence. The West Pakistani government's inadequate response to the disaster further alienated the Bengalis, who felt neglected and exploited by the central government.

• The central Pakistani government's feeble response was almost as if they just didn’t care.
• The international response was much more visible than Pakistan’s meager effort.

Catalyst for secession. The cyclone and its aftermath served as a catalyst for Bengali nationalism, solidifying support for Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the Awami League, and ultimately leading to the push for an independent Bangladesh.

3. India's Strategic Interests Intertwined with Humanitarian Concerns

Indira Gandhi and her top advisers were coldly calculating strategists, even if their actions served a humane cause.

Humanitarian crisis. India faced a massive influx of Bengali refugees fleeing the violence in East Pakistan, straining its resources and creating social and political instability.

• The needs of this new, desperate population were far beyond the capacities of the feeble governments of India’s border states.
• Unimaginably huge numbers of Bengalis escaped into safety on Indian soil, eventually totaling as many as ten million.

Strategic opportunity. The crisis also presented India with an opportunity to weaken its rival, Pakistan, and assert its dominance in the region.

• India secretly had its army and security forces use bases on Indian soil to support Bengali guerrillas in their fight against the Pakistani state.
• India knew it had a fearsome military advantage, and Gandhi’s government used that ruthlessly.

Complex motivations. India's intervention was driven by a combination of genuine humanitarian concern for the Bengali people and strategic calculations aimed at advancing its own national interests.

4. The US Government Ignored Warnings of Impending Genocide

The judgment of all of us is that with the number of troops available to Yahya (a total of 20,000, with 12,000 combat troops) and a hostile East Pakistan population of 75 million, the result would be a blood-bath with no hope of West Pakistan reestablishing control over East Pakistan.

Intelligence ignored. Despite warnings from its own diplomats and intelligence agencies about the likelihood of a violent crackdown in East Pakistan, the Nixon administration chose to remain silent.

• The White House took almost no interest in upholding the results of Pakistan’s grand experiment in democracy.
• Kissinger urged the president to do nothing, writing that the U.S. government’s consensus was that “the best posture was to remain inactive and do nothing that Yahya might find objectionable.”

Missed opportunities. The US failed to use its influence to dissuade Yahya Khan from using force against his own population, missing a crucial opportunity to prevent the impending genocide.

• They did not urge caution or impose conditions that might have discouraged the Pakistani military government from butchering its own citizenry.
• They did not threaten the loss of U.S. support or even sanctions if Pakistan took the wrong course.

Prioritizing realpolitik. The White House prioritized its relationship with Pakistan and its secret channel to China over the lives of Bengali civilians, demonstrating a callous disregard for human rights.

5. The "Blood Telegram" Marked a Moment of Moral Dissent

[H]ere in Dacca we are mute and horrified witnesses to a reign of terror by the Pak military.

Diplomatic protest. Archer Blood, the US consul general in Dacca, and his staff sent a blistering telegram to Washington, denouncing the US government's silence in the face of atrocities and accusing Pakistan of "selective genocide."

• That cable—perhaps the most radical rejection of U.S. policy ever sent by its diplomats—blasted the United States for silence in the face of atrocities, for not denouncing the quashing of democracy, for showing “moral bankruptcy” in the face of what they bluntly called genocide.
• This was, Blood knew, the last thing his superiors in Washington wanted to hear.

Moral outrage. The "Blood Telegram" represented a rare moment of moral clarity within the US government, as diplomats risked their careers to speak out against the atrocities being committed by a US ally.

• The U.S. consulate gave detailed accounts of the killings at Dacca University, ordinarily a leafy, handsome enclave.
• The U.S. consulate gave detailed accounts of the killings at Dacca University, ordinarily a leafy, handsome enclave.

Consequences of dissent. Blood and his staff faced professional repercussions for their outspokenness, highlighting the challenges of speaking truth to power within a rigid bureaucratic system.

6. Nixon and Kissinger Prioritized China Over Human Rights

So the Bengalis became collateral damage for realigning the global balance of power.

Strategic alignment. Nixon and Kissinger's pursuit of a secret channel to China, facilitated by Yahya Khan, led them to prioritize their relationship with Pakistan over the humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan.

• Nixon and Kissinger needed a secret channel to China, which they found in the good offices of Yahya—an impeccably discreet tyrant on warm terms with both the United States and China.
• While the Pakistani government was crushing the Bengalis, it was also carrying covert messages back and forth from Washington to Beijing.

Collateral damage. The Bengalis became "collateral damage" in the US's efforts to realign the global balance of power, as Nixon and Kissinger were unwilling to jeopardize their relationship with Yahya Khan by condemning his actions.

• Nixon and Kissinger, always sympathetic to the Pakistani junta, were not about to condemn it while it was making itself so useful.
• The strategic opening to one Asian titan meant a closing to another.

Moral compromise. The US's pursuit of strategic interests led to a moral compromise, as the White House knowingly supported a murderous regime at a crucial moment in history.

7. India's Intervention Led to the Creation of Bangladesh

It was left to India, which did not have the option of ignoring the slaughter of the Bengalis, to stop it.

Military intervention. India's military intervention in December 1971 brought a swift end to the war, resulting in Pakistan's defeat and the creation of the independent state of Bangladesh.

• The war, fought in just two weeks, ended with a resounding Indian victory, and created the fledgling state of Bangladesh.
• Pakistan rashly struck the first blow of a full-scale conventional war, with a surprise air attack in December 1971 that brought fierce combat in both West and East Pakistan.

Humanitarian imperative. India's intervention was motivated by a desire to end the slaughter of Bengali civilians and uphold the popular will of voters in a democratic election.

• Indira Gandhi’s government was motivated by a mix of lofty principle and brutal realpolitik: demanding an end to the slaughter of a civilian population and upholding the popular will of voters in a democratic election, but also seizing a prime opportunity to humiliate and rip apart India’s hated enemy.
• India did not stop masses of Bengali refugees from flooding into India.

Complex legacy. India's actions were not without their own complexities and contradictions, as the country simultaneously repressed its own restive populations and pursued its strategic interests.

8. The Bangladesh War Left a Legacy of Trauma and Mistrust

Nixon and Kissinger set the stage for an ongoing decimation of Pakistan’s democratic opposition, giving time and space to Islamicize the country more and more.

Enduring trauma. The 1971 war remains a source of trauma for Pakistan, marking the loss of its eastern wing and heightening its sense of vulnerability to India.

• For Pakistan, the crisis of 1971 is mourned as a supreme national trauma: not just the loss of one of the country’s two wings and the majority of its population, but a heightening of a truncated state’s dread of the much larger and stronger Indian enemy.
• Pakistanis have not forgotten 1971.

Erosion of democracy. The US's support for military dictators in Pakistan, exemplified by Nixon's embrace of Yahya Khan, contributed to the decimation of Pakistan's democratic opposition and the rise of Islamic extremism.

• Nixon and Kissinger set the stage for an ongoing decimation of Pakistan’s democratic opposition, giving time and space to Islamicize the country more and more.
• This pattern of U.S. antidemocratic engagement has helped convince so many Pakistanis that the United States coldly pursues its own realpolitik interests and cares nothing for them.

Lingering mistrust. The events of 1971 continue to shape US-Pakistani relations, fueling Pakistani perceptions that the US is a self-interested actor with little regard for their well-being.

Last updated: March 15, 2025