Speech Acts

1. Language as Rule-Governed Behavior: Speech Acts

The hypothesis then of this work is that speaking a language is engaging in a rule-governed form of behavior.

Talking is acting. The core idea is that speaking a language isn't just about uttering sounds or writing symbols; it's about performing actions according to rules. This perspective shifts the focus from language as a static system to language as a dynamic form of behavior, much like playing a game or following a social convention.

Speech acts as the unit of communication. The fundamental unit of linguistic communication isn't the word, sentence, or symbol, but the speech act. This involves the production or issuance of a symbol, word, or sentence in the performance of an act, such as making a statement, asking a question, or giving a command.

Implications of the rule-governed view. This hypothesis has significant implications for how we understand language. It suggests that the semantic structure of a language can be seen as a conventional realization of underlying constitutive rules, and that speech acts are performed by uttering expressions in accordance with these rules.

2. Illocutionary Acts: The Speaker's Intentions

Austin baptized these complete speech acts with the name "illocutionary acts", and I shall henceforth employ this terminology.

Complete speech acts. Illocutionary acts are complete speech acts, such as stating, questioning, commanding, promising, etc. These acts go beyond simply uttering words; they involve the speaker's intention to achieve a specific communicative goal.

Three distinct kinds of acts:

• Utterance acts: Uttering words, morphemes, sentences.
• Propositional acts: Referring and predicating.
• Illocutionary acts: Stating, questioning, commanding, promising.

Perlocutionary acts. These are the consequences or effects of illocutionary acts on the actions, thoughts, or beliefs of hearers. For example, by warning someone, I may scare or alarm them.

3. Constitutive Rules: The Foundation of Speech

Constitutive rules do not merely regulate, they create or define new forms of behavior.

Creating new possibilities. Constitutive rules don't just regulate existing behavior; they create the very possibility of new forms of behavior. The rules of chess, for example, don't merely regulate playing chess, but create the activity of playing chess itself.

"X counts as Y". Constitutive rules often take the form "X counts as Y in context C". For example, in a baseball game, a player having possession of the ball in the opponents' end zone while a play is in progress counts as a touchdown.

Language as a system of constitutive rules. The semantic structure of a language can be regarded as a conventional realization of a series of sets of underlying constitutive rules. Speech acts are performed by uttering expressions in accordance with these sets of constitutive rules.

4. The Principle of Expressibility: Saying What You Mean

I take it to be an analytic truth about language that whatever can be meant can be said.

Meaning and expression. The principle of expressibility states that whatever can be meant can be said. A given language may not have the resources to say what I mean, but there are no barriers in principle to supplementing the language or saying what I mean in a richer one.

Implications for speech acts. This principle enables us to equate rules for performing speech acts with rules for uttering certain linguistic elements. For any possible speech act, there is a possible linguistic element the meaning of which is sufficient to determine that its literal utterance is a performance of precisely that speech act.

Nonliteralness, vagueness, ambiguity, and incompleteness. Cases where the speaker does not say exactly what he means are not theoretically essential to linguistic communication. It is always possible for the speaker to say exactly what he means.

5. Reference: Identifying Objects in Discourse

Referring expressions point to particular things; they answer the questions "Who?" "What?" "Which?"

Singular definite referring expressions. These expressions, such as "you," "the battle of Waterloo," and "Caesar," serve to pick out or identify one object apart from other objects. They answer the questions "Who?", "What?", and "Which?".

Reference as a speech act. Reference is a speech act performed by speakers in uttering words, not by words themselves. To say that an expression refers is shorthand for saying that the expression is used by speakers to refer.

Definite reference. The speech act of referring is explained by giving examples of paradigmatic referring expressions, by explaining the function which the utterance of these expressions serves in the complete speech act, and by contrasting the use of these expressions with other expressions.

6. Predication: Ascribing Properties and Raising Questions

My use of the verb "predicate" departs seriously from the traditional philosophic use and requires justification.

Expressions, not universals. Expressions, not universals, are predicated of objects. This convention is adopted because the introduction of universals seems misleading and unnecessary in giving an account of the use of predicate expressions.

Predication in different illocutionary acts. The same predication can occur in different kinds of illocutionary acts, such as assertions, questions, and commands. This highlights the similarity between assertions and other illocutionary acts.

Raising the question of truth. To predicate an expression of an object is to raise the question of the truth of the predicate expression of the object referred to. This characterization captures what is common to a wide range of illocutionary acts.

7. The Naturalistic Fallacy Fallacy: "Is" and "Ought"

It is tempting, but a mistake, to think that the negation of an illocutionary force indicating device leaves us with a negative assertion about the speaker, concerning his non-performance of some illocutionary act.

Descriptive vs. evaluative statements. The naturalistic fallacy fallacy is the mistaken belief that it is logically impossible for any set of descriptive statements to entail an evaluative statement. This view is often based on a rigid distinction between facts and values.

Counter-examples. The simplest way to show that the naturalistic fallacy fallacy is mistaken is to give counter-examples where statements which are clearly cases of what the theorists in question would consider 'descriptive' obviously and unquestionably entail statements which are clearly cases of what the theorists in question would consider 'evaluative'.

The role of definitions. In some cases, the definition of a term can bridge the gap between descriptive and evaluative statements. For example, the definition of "valid deductive argument" includes the requirement that the premises entail the conclusion.

8. The Speech Act Fallacy: Beyond Commendation

In the performance of an illocutionary act in the literal utterance of a sentence, the speaker intends to produce a certain effect by means of getting the hearer to recognize his intention to produce that effect; and furthermore, if he is using words literally, he intends this recognition to be achieved in virtue of the fact that the rules for using the expressions he utters associate the expression with the production of that effect.

"W is used to perform act A". The speech act fallacy involves analyzing the meaning of a word by stating that it is used to perform a specific speech act. This approach often draws an analogy between the word being analyzed and performative verbs.

The condition of adequacy. Any analysis of the meaning of a word must be consistent with the fact that the same word can mean the same thing in all the grammatically different kinds of sentences in which it can occur. The speech act analysis fails to meet this condition.

Intention and convention. Meaning is more than a matter of intention; it is also a matter of convention. One's meaning something when one utters a sentence is more than just randomly related to what the sentence means in the language one is speaking.

9. The Assertion Fallacy: Context and Applicability

Speaking a language is engaging in a (highly complex) rule-governed form of behavior.

Confusing conditions for assertion with concept analysis. The assertion fallacy involves confusing the conditions for the performance of the speech act of assertion with the analysis of the meaning of particular words occurring in certain assertions.

The "What would we say if..." question. The answer to the philosopher's question, "What would we say if... ?" is not a prediction about future verbal behavior but a hypothetical statement of intention within a system of rules.

The "What would we say if..." question. The answer to the philosopher's question, "What would we say if... ?" is not a prediction about future verbal behavior but a hypothetical statement of intention within a system of rules.

Last updated: February 28, 2025